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ABSTRACT

Title of the research paper:

Risk Analysis of Fire/ Explosion to the LNG
Fuelled Passenger Ferries

Degree:

MSc

The research paper is a study of fire/explosion risk on the LNG fuelled passenger
ferries. The principal of FSA methods in the IMO guideline is followed and
techniques of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are used in the study.
The development of LNG fuelled passenger ferries around the world is introduced
briefly at first, their specific design, arrangement and related safety requirements are
discussed, the major LNG related hazards are also represented in the paper. In Step 1
of hazard identification, the potential hazards of fire/explosion on LNG passenger
ferries are identified and ranked according to the different operation phases of the
ship by the PHA. In Step 2 of risk analysis, a quantitative assessment to the high
risks of fire/explosion and related scenarios are conducted by setting up risk models,
some assumptions and results from other related reports and study are used in the
calculations.
Based on the analysis to the high risk areas of fire/explosion on the LNG fuelled
passenger ferries, potential measurements to reduce the risks are recommended, and
some suggestions for the safety administration are put forward.

KEYWORDS: Risk, Analysis, Fire/ Explosion, LNG fuel, Passenger ferry
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ChapterⅠ Introduction

1.1 Background

LNG is a kind of clean energy and an alternative fuel to the fuel oil applied on board.
It is an efficient way to eliminate the emission of SOx and particular matters of ships,
and could cut down the emission of NOx and CO2 by about 80% and 20%
respectively compared to the high sulphur residual fuels (BV, 2001).

LNG firstly has served as a marine fuel since 1964 on the LNG carriers by using the
boil-off gas, and was utilized in the boiler or duel fuel engines (Herdzik, 2011,
p.169). Under the background of stricter international regulations and regional
legislations on the ship emission control as well as high oil price, a rapid
development of LNG as a fuel source on the other type of vessels can be seen in the
past decade, especially on the passenger ferries and cargo ships engaged in coastal or
short sea transportation. On the other hand, because of the special characteristics of
LNG, it brings many concerns and doubts on the safety issues as a new type of fuel
on the ships during the application. Many risks such as cryogenic damage, fire/
explosion should be assessed in the operation and safety management.

1.2 Objectives and scope

This paper is intended to investigate the causes of fire/explosion risks during the
operation of LNG fuelled passenger ferries and identify their consequences to the
crew and passengers on board to the possible extend, to recommend mitigation
measures in the safety management.
The LNG fuelled passenger ferries with dual fuel engines or gas engines which are
regulated by the IMO “Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine
installations in ships” are in the scope of study. The fire/explosions caused by
terrorisms or during the repair and maintenance in the shipyards are out of the scope.
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1.3 Methodology

The methodology introduced in Step1 and Step2 of formal safety assessment of IMO
guideline was followed. Scenarios and risk models of fire/explosions were set up
based on the LNG special hazards, ship design and arrangements as well as different
operation phases of the ship. Because of the limited historical statistics and data of
LNG fuelled ferries as a new type of ships, literature reviews and other risk
assessment reports and studies on the LNG carriers and passenger ships are referred
and utilized in HAZID session and quantification of the frequency and fatalities to
the possible extend.

According to the IMO guideline on the formal safety assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2007,
p.5), the following steps should be followed and the risk management process is
shown in Figure 1:
1. Identification of hazards;
2. Risk analysis;
3. Risk control options;
4. Cost benefit assessment;
5. Recommendations for decision-making.
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Figure 1

A generic risk management process (Source: MSC Circ. 1023)
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Chapter Ⅱ Brief Introduction to the LNG Fuelled Passenger Ferries

2.1 LNG fuelled passenger ships around the world
The car ferry “Glutra” finished in 2000 was the first LNG fuelled passenger ferry in
the world. Since then, a number of LNG passenger ships of similar type were built,
most of them are in Norway. Up to June of 2012, there were 30 LNG fuelled ships in
operation and 32 confirmed LNG new builds of the world, as shown in Table 1 and
Table 2 (DNV, 2013). Most of the LNG fuelled passenger ships are engaged in short
sea or coastal transportation.
The world’s largest LNG fuelled passenger vessel “Viking Grace” was delivered in
January of 2013, which was constructed for the Viking Line to operate in Finland,
Sweden and along the Baltic countries. It has a capability for about 2800 passengers,
200 crew, 1300 lane meters for trucks and 500 lane meters for cars (Washington,
2011).
High speed LNG catamaran had been under construction in Australia and planned to
go into service in 2012 between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. It will be dual fuel,
capable of operating on LNG or diesel, and will have capacity for 153 vehicles,
1,000 passengers, and have speeds up to 50 knots (Washington, 2011).

However, many more countries seem eager to use LNG (and CNG) as alternative
ships fuel. A demonstration project has been started for operation of LNG fuelled
riverboats at the Yangtze River in 2010 under the cooperation of China MSA, CCS,
ship owners and LNG supplying company. According to the estimation of IMO,
there would be 800-1000 LNG fuelled ships up to 2015 around the world (Pan & Liu,
2012).
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Table 1

LNG fuelled ships in operation worldwide
(Up to June of 2012, source: DNV)

Year

Type of vessel

Owner

Class

Year

Type of vessel

Owner

Class

2000

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2010

Patrol vessel

REM

DNV

2003

PSV

Simon Møkster

DNV

2010

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2003

PSV

Eidesvik

DNV

2010

Patrol vessel

REM

DNV

2006

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2010

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2007

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2010

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2007

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2010

Car/passenger ferry

Fosen Namsos Sjø

DNV

2007

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2011

PSV

DOF

DNV

2007

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2011

Chemical tanker

Tarbit Shipping

GL

2008

PSV

Eidesvik Shipping

DNV

2011

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2009

PSV

Eidesvik Shipping

DNV

2011

PSV

Solstad Rederi

DNV

2009

Car/passenger ferry

Tide

DNV

2012

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2009

Car/passenger ferry

Tide

DNV

2012

PSV

Eidesvik

DNV

2009

Car/passenger ferry

Tide

DNV

2012

PSV

Olympic Shipping

DNV

2009

Patrol vessel

REM

DNV

2012

PSV

Island Offshore

DNV

2009

Car/passenger ferry

Fjord1

DNV

2012

General Cargo

Nordnorsk Shipping

DNV

Table 2 Confirmed orderbook of LNG newbuilds
(Up to June of 2012, source: DNV)
Year

Type of vessel

Owner

Class

Year

Type of vessel

Owner

Class

2012

PSV

Eidesvik Shipping

DNV

2013

Ro-Ro

Norlines

DNV

2012

Ro-Ro

Sea-Cargo

DNV

2013

Ro-Ro

Norlines

DNV

2012

Ro-Ro

Sea-Cargo

DNV

2013

RoPax

Viking Line

LR

2012

High speed RoPax

Buquebus

DNV

2013

Tug

Buksér& Berging

DNV

2012

PSV

Island Offshore

DNV

2013

PSV

Harvey Gulf Int. Marine

ABS

2012

PSV

REM

DNV

2013

PSV

Harvey Gulf Int. Marine

ABS

2012

Car/passenger ferry

Torghatten Nord

DNV

2013

Patrol vessel

Finish Border Guard

GL

2012

Car/passenger ferry

Torghatten Nord

DNV

2013

Car/passenge ferry

Society of Quebec ferries

2012

Car/passenger ferry

Torghatten Nord

DNV

2013

Tug

CNOOC

2012

Car/passenger ferry

Torghatten Nord

DNV

2013

Tug

CNOOC

2012

Harbor vessel

Incheon Port
Authority

2014

Car/passenger ferry

Society of Quebec ferries

2013

RoPax

Fjordline

DNV

2014

Car/passenger ferry

Society of Quebec ferries

2013

RoPax

Fjordline

DNV

2014

Tug

Buksér & Berging

DNV

2013

General

Cargo Eidsvaag

DNV

2014

PSV

Harvey Gulf Int. Marine

ABS
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2013

Car/passenger ferry

Norled

2014

PSV

Harvey Gulf Int. Marine

2013

Car/passenger ferry

Norled

2014

PSV

Remøy Shipping

2.2 Ship design and arrangements
Because of the use of LNG as fuel on board, the ship design and arrangements of
LNG fuelled ferries should comply with the specific requirements of IMO
regulations and Class Society rules to the gas-fuelled ships, and also should satisfy
the general requirements to the all passenger ships. The specific ship design and
arrangements of LNG fuelled ferries mainly include:

2.2.1 LNG fuel tanks
The energy density of liquefied natural gas (LNG) increases by 600 times compared
to its gas state at the normal pressure and room temperature, but it is only about half
the energy density of oil. So the space for the LNG is larger than for fuel oil on board.
In the existing LNG fuelled ships, the LNG is stored in cylindrical, double-wall,
vacuum insulated stainless steel tanks, the tank pressure usually is less than 5 bar and
the typical size is less than 200m3 (Danish EPA, 2010, pp. 23-25).

Figure 2

The LNG tank sizes for some selected ships already built or under construction

(Source: Danish EPA)
According to the requirements of IMO “Interim guidelines on safety for natural
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ABS

gas-fuelled engine installations in ships”, LNG fuel tanks should be an independent
tank designed in accordance with Chapter 4 of the IGC Code, and the height of outlet
from the pressure relief valves as well as the safety distance from air intake, air outlet,
opening and furnace installation are required. LNG fuel tanks could be located on
open deck or in enclosed space if fulfill certain requirements. For passenger ships,
the LNG fuel tanks should be located at least B/5 from the ship’s side when on open
deck; LNG fuel tanks with a maximum acceptable working pressure of 10 bar may
be located in enclosed space, and gas storage tanks should be located as close as
possible to the ship centerline: minimum B/5 from the ship side, minimum, the lesser
of B/15 and 2 m from the bottom plating, and not less than 760 mm from the shell
plating( IMO, 2009, p.19), just as showed in Figure 3 .

Figure 3 The gas tank location of the LNG fuelled ships ( Source: DNV)
2.2.2 Engine room safety concepts
According to the IMO interim guidelines on the gas fuelled ships, two alternative
system configurations may be accepted: Gas safe machinery space and
ESD-protected machinery space.
In the Inherently Gas Safe Engine Rooms, the space is considered gas safe under all
conditions, normal as well as abnormal conditions (IMO, 2009, p.15). All gas supply
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piping within machinery space is double pipe/ duct which is pressurized and filled
with inert gas or ventilated and fitted with gas detection. The room around is an
ordinary machinery space without special requirements. The concept is mandatory
for high pressure piping (>10 bar), but can also be used with low pressure
installations.

Figure 4 Double piping in the inherently gas safe engine room (Source: DNV)
ESD protected machinery space is arranged that is considered non hazardous under
normal conditions, but under certain abnormal conditions may have the potential to
become gas hazardous. In the event of abnormal conditions involving gas hazards,
emergency shutdown (ESD) of non-safe equipment (ignition sources) and machinery
shall be automatically executed while equipment or machinery in use or active
during these conditions shall be of explosion protected design (IMO, 2009, p.16).

In the ESD Protected Engine Rooms, Gas detection system with at least 3 detectors
in ER should be arranged, and two detectors read 20% LEL (lower explosion limit),
when the detectors are activated the fuel supply automatically shuts down and all non
explosion protected equipment is to be electrically disconnected. The pressure in gas
supply lines within machinery spaces should be less than 10 bar and two or more
engine rooms should be independent of each other. The Ventilation should be 30 air
changes / hour and there are limitations of the equipments which can be located in
the engine rooms (Deng, 2012).
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Figure 5

ESD Protected Engine Rooms (Source: DNV)

There are also requirements on the propulsion redundancy that at least 40% of the
propulsion power plus normal electrical power should be maintained if the gas
supply is shut down to any machinery space due to a gas leakage.
2.2.3 Bunkering
IMO Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships
provides requirements of the fuel bunkering system and distributing system to the
gas fuelled ships (see Figure 6), there are also other related rules and regulations such
as the CCS and DNV class rules and rules developed by the Norwegian Maritime
Directorate for the issue. However, less experience and documentations are on the
port and bunker operations for LNG, standards don’t cover this issue completely.
DNV has proposed to develop standard for LNG bunkering equipment and
procedures to ISO TC67/WG10, many companies and individuals have expressed
indicated interest for participation (Rysst, 2011). Under the condition of miss of
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standards, risk assessment should be followed in the safety management.
There are mainly three bunkering solutions to do LNG bunkering: Truck to ship
(TTS), Intermediate tank to ship (TPS) and Ship to Ship (STS), each method has its
own characteristics and applicability.

Truck to ship (TTS) bunkering method is the most common method today, but the
volume of bunkering is limited each time. About 25 tonnes of LNG could be carried
by the LNG tank truck depending on its capacity and the national transport
regulations as well as the infrastructure of the road. If the volume of the LNG fuelled
ships is large (>50 tonnes), other bunker methods would be better. On the other hand,
there is a significant impact of the possibilities to parallel operation when the bunker
operation was carried out on the quay side of the vessel, cargo and passenger
handling might be conducted.

Another common bunkering method is Intermediate tank to ship (TPS). LNG fuel is
bunkered by pipeline directly from an intermediate LNG tank ashore. The size of
LNG tank could vary from a few tones to several thousands of tones depending on
the demand of LNG fuelled vessels and condition of location. But the flexibility is
limited as the bunkering position is fixed.

Ship to Ship (STS) bunkering is the feasible option on the flexibility and capacity
compared other two bunkering methods, which could be used to bunker most kind of
ship types, but the initial investment and operational cost would be reasonable high.
(Algell & Bakosch, 2012, p.77)

For the LNG fuelled car and passenger ferry “Glutra” of Norwegian, it has two LNG
tanks onboard and 32 m3 each. Refueling is conducted every 4-5 days and takes 1-2
hours for a truckload of 40 m3 of LNG. The bunkering operation is carried out when
the ferry is at berth for night and no passengers on board. For the other LNG fuelled
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passenger ferries in Norwegian such as Tidekongen, Tidedronningen and
Tideprinsessen operating from Oslo, their LNG tank onboard are 29 m3 and they are
refueled about once a week by a dedicated truck with a typically capacity of 50 m3
(Danish EPA, 2010, p.26).

Figure 6

The bunkering system of gas fuelled ships (source: DNV)

2.2.4 Hazardous areas
Hazardous area zones are defined in the IMO “Inter guidelines on safety for natural
gas-fuelled engine installations in ships”, the areas with risk of explosive gas
atmosphere are analyzed and classified. Hazardous areas are divided into Zone 0,
Zone 1 and Zone 2. Electrical equipments located in the hazards zones should be
certified as explosion safe in that zone (Deng, 2012).
2.3 Areas of safety concern
2.3.1 LNG specific hazards
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is at about temperature of -163 °C, and it is a clear,
non-corrosive, non-toxic, cryogenic liquid at normal atmospheric pressure, the
boiling point is -161.5 °C at normal conditions and the flash point is -187.8 °C , the

11

specific gravity of liquid is 0.45 and 0.6 of gas (Herdzik, 2011, p.170).
The flammability range for vaporized LNG in air is 5% (LFL) to 15% (UFL) and its
auto-ignition temperature is above 540 °C (Foss, 2012, pp.14-18). The types of
potential LNG hazards of most concern by the operators and stakeholders include:
Explosion. An explosion may happen when LNG reaches its flammability mixed
with air and ignited or uncontrollably released from a pressurized state. If there is a
structural failure such as puncture of the container, there would be an uncontrolled
release. However, LNG usually is stored at an extremely low temperature (-163 °C),
so no high pressure is required to maintain its liquid state.

Vapor Clouds. When the LNG is warmed up, it turns from liquid to gas. Initially the
gas is colder and heavier than the surrounding air and a vapor cloud would be formed
above the released liquid. After the gas is warmed up, it would mix with the
surrounding air and disperse into the atmosphere. The vapor clouds may be ignited
and cause fire/explosion if it concentrates within its flammability range and
encounter an ignition source.

Pool fire. If the leakage of LNG mixed with the air is ignited by the ignition source
nearby, there would be a pool fire above the LNG pool. The pool fire would be more
rapid and intense than the oil fire. It could not be extinguished easily before the LNG
is consumed up or the source of LNG leakage is cut off. The thermal radiation of a
pool fire may cause injury to the people and damage to the property within certain
distance depending on the scale of the pool fire (IMO, 2007, p.8).

Cryogenic damage. LNG is stored at extremely low temperature (about -163℃), so it
would cause metal embrittlement, cracking or structural failure if the containment
systems fail to work. It also would cause frost burns to the personnel if protective
equipments are not wear during the operation or encounter accidental leakages of the
LNG.
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Rapid phase transition (RPT). If large amount of LNG is leaked on water, it would
vapor very quickly and cause a rapid phase transition (RPT). During the process, heat
is transferred from water to the LNG at a temperature difference of about 175℃
(depending on the temperature of the water) and cause physical or cold explosion. It
ranges from small pops to blasts large enough to potentially damage lightweight
structures (Foss, 2012, p.19).

Sloshing. If the LNG tank on ship is partially filled, a violent motion of the fluid
would be caused and lead to an increased high pressure of LNG on the tank walls,
especially in the bad weather and rough sea.

Boiling liquid expanding explosions. An explosion might be caused if the LNG tank
ruptures because that the temperature in the LNG tank is above the boiling point of
the LNG and the pressure relief system of the tank is out of function.
2.3.2 Special concerns to the LNG fuelled ships
Due to the specific chemical and physical properties of LNG, special consideration
should be taken into account in the design, construction, installation, commissioning
and operation of LNG fuelled ships compared to the conventional oil fuelled ships.
Risk assessments to the LNG specific hazards need to be carried out, and the
following important aspects should be considered:
1. Risks originating from fuel storage and gas supply system
2. Risks related to the bunkering operations
3. Risks related to external forces to the fuel storage facility
4. Risks associated to collision/ contact involving LNG fuelled vessels
The main consequences related to health and safety risks at LNG fuelled propulsion
systems are fire and explosion (Danish EPA, 2010, p.110).
2.4 Safety rules and regulations
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2.4.1 Maritime regulations for all passenger ships
IMO has developed and adopted a series of regulations on the safety of passenger
ships, and most of the regulations are the consequences of lessons and experiences
drawn from the major passenger ship accidents which resulted in a large number of
life loss of the crews and passengers. (IMO, 2008, p5)

The international convention for the safety of life at sea (SOLAS) is the most
important regulation for the safety of passenger ships, which contains the basic
construction and management requirement and covers the major areas related to the
safety of passenger ships: subdivision and stability; fire safety; life-saving appliances;
machinery and electrical installation; safety management, etc. There are also a
number of mandatory codes under the SOLAS convention for the safety of ships,
such as the ISM code, FSS code and ISPS code which have more detailed
requirements for the safety and security of passenger ships.
Other safety and environmental issues such as load limit of the ship are contained in
the International convention on Load Lines ( LOADLINE) (IMO, 2005) , the issues
of steering, lights and signals are contained in the International Convention for the
prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREG) (IMO, 2003), the issues related to the
training of crews on board are contained in international Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention) (IMO,
2011) and issues of ship pollutions are contained in the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (IMO, 2002). They are
applicable to passenger ships as well as other types of ships.

2.4.2 Regulations specific to the LNG fuelled passenger ships
The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC code) provides a serious of requirements to the safety
related to the ship design, construction, equipments and operations of ships carrying
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liquefied gases for bulk (IMO, 1993). However, it is not applicable to the LNG
fuelled ships other than LNG carriers, but it allows the natural gas which flashpoint
is below 60℃ applied on board as a fuel. Some of the classification societies have
developed requirements for the use of natural gas as fuel on ships based on this code (Danish
EPA, 2010, p.59). A number of regulations of the IMO “Interim guidelines on safety

for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in ships” also refer to the IGC code on
some specific requirements such as the Material requirements, Arrangement of
entrances and other openings, LNG fuel storage tanks and etc.
The “Interim guidelines on safety for natural gas-fuelled engine installations in
ships” was developed by the IMO to provide an international standard for natural
gas-fuelled ships other than vessels covered by the IGC Code (IMO, 2009). The
requirements to the LNG fuelled passenger ships in the guideline are stricter than
other types of natural gas-fuelled ships. Its goal is to ensure the arrangement and
installation of gas-fuelled machinery for propulsion and auxiliary purposes have an
equivalent level of integrity in terms of safety, reliability and dependability compared
to the conventional oil fueled types. On the other hand, the International Code of
Safety for Gas-fuelled Ships (IGF Code) is in the process of developing by the
concerned committee of IMO.
There are also class society rules and national regulations for the LNG fuelled ships,
such as the DNV and CCS publish the guidelines for the design, installation and
survey of gas-fuelled propulsion systems. In Norway, the introduction of LNG
fuelled ships has lead to an adaptation of the regulations set by the Norwegian
Maritime Directorate (NMD) in 2000 (Danish EPA, 2010, p.58). However, there are
a number of areas related to the safety of LNG fuelled ships haven’t been covered,
such as the operation of bunkering, the specific standards on the training and
certification of seafarers work on the LNG fuelled ships.
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Chapter Ⅲ Identification of Fire/ Explosion Hazards to the LNG Fuelled
Passenger Ferries

3.1 Objective and scope
The objective of this chapter is to identify the hazards related to the fire/explosions
and related scenarios on the LNG fuelled ferries during the operation, to provide a
list of prioritized hazards and their associated scenarios in the next step of risk
analysis.

The HAZID focuses on the hazards of fire/explosions during the operation of LNG
fuelled ferries. The hazards of fire/explosions when ship is at yard for
repairs/docking are out of scope. The fire/explosions caused by the terrorism attack
also are not included in the scope.

The HAZID session focuses on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries with dual fuel
engine or gas engine, and the following operational phases are taken into account in
this session:
1. Loading
2. Departing quay
3. Under way
4. Arriving at port, mooring and preparing for unloading
5. Unloading
6. Bunkering
3.2 Methods and techniques
“Hazard” is defined as a potential to threaten human life, health, property or the
environment. Both of creative and analytical techniques are used for the
identification of hazards (IMO, 2007). These techniques generally include (Pan, 2004,
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p.17):
1. Brainstorming;
2. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA);
3. Event Tree Analysis (ETA);
4. Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP);
5. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA);
6. What if Analysis Technique;
7. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).
In this study, because the LNG fuelled passenger ferry is a new type of vessel and the
historical data is limited, so the method of brainstorm and Preliminary Hazard
Analysis (PHA) were used, results from other studies of HAZID to LNG fuelled
ships are referred.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a qualitative technique to identify the hazards,
assess the severity of potential accidents that might happen in a system, and identify
measures for reducing or eliminating the risks associated with the hazards. It mainly
focuses on identifying the weaknesses and problems of a system in its early stage of
design, in the condition of little detailed information or few operating procedures.
PHA is a broad and preliminary study for further detailed risk analysis (Mullai, 2006,
p.112).
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Identifying object
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Analyzing on the system

Identifying hazards

Measures identify

Figure 7

Framework of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

3.3 The background of LNG safety incidents
Since 1964, the LNG carriers have used the boil off gas of LNG as fuel onboard.
Many LNG carriers have long and good experiences with the use of natural gas as
fuel for the propulsion machinery, mainly steam turbines (Danish EPA, 2010, p.58).
The maritime incidents with severe LNG releases in the history of the LNG industry
are rare. During the 60-year history of 59,000 voyages of the industry, no spillage of
LNG from a ship into the water which resulted from collision or grounding has
occurred (Foss, 2012, p.64). The good design and maintenance of LNG ships reduces
the risks of severe incidents. The containment systems also prevent the breach of
cargo tanks and the spill of LNG.
Based on the statistics of the U.S. Department of Energy, there are only 8 marine
incidents worldwide that resulted in spillage of LNG in the 60 years history of the
industry, some caused deck-plating damage under the manifold piping due to brittle
fracture. There has never been LNG cargo related fires and LNG related fatality on
board, all LNG-related injuries and fatalities have occurred within an LNG facility or
ashore (Foss, 2012, p.65). The major marine LNG incidents are listed in Table 3
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below.

In 2000, the first LNG fuelled car and passenger ferries “Glutra” was launched in
Norway, and up to now there are about 30 LNG fuelled ships in operation worldwide
excluding LNG carriers. Good safety record has been kept and no injuries or
fatalities occurred during the more than 10 years’ experience. No reported or
recorded accidents , only some backfire in engine manifolds due to sudden change in
load and 2 cases of blackout on new ferry's and consequential anchor dropping–
reason not known but possible unstable gas heating. There was one heavy crash with
quay due to failure in maneuvering system, but no problem with the LNG tank or gas
system (Norwegian Maritime Authority, 2012).
Table 3 Major marine LNG Incidents (source: the U.S. Department of Energy)
Incident
Date

Ship / Facility
name

1965

Location

Ship
status

Injuries/
fatalities

Canvey
Island, UK

A transfer
operation

1 seriously
burned

Ship/
Property
damage

LNG
spill/
Release

Description

Yes

1965

Jules Vernet

Loading

No

Yes

Yes

Overfilling. Tank cover and
deck fractures.

1965

Methane Princess

Disconnect
ing after
discharge

No

Yes

Yes

Valve leakage. Deck fractures

1971

1974
1974
1977
1979

LNG ship Esso
Brega

Massachusetts
Methane Progress
LNG Aquarius
Mostefa
Ben-Boulaid Ship

Italy

Unloading

No

No

Yes

Loading
In port
Loading

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes

First documented LNG Rollover
incident. Tank developed a
sudden increase in pressure.
LNG vapor discharged from the
tank safety valves and vents.
Tank roof slightly damaged. No
ignition
Valve leakage. Deck fractures
Touched bottom at Arzew.
Tank overfilled.

Unloading

No

Yes

Yes

Valve leakage. Deck fractures.

1979

Pollenger Ship

Unloading

No

Yes

Yes

1979

El Paso Paul Kayser
Ship

At sea

No

Yes

No

1980

LNG Libra

At sea

No

Yes

No

1980

LNG Taurus

In port

No

Yes

No

1984

Melrose

At sea

No

Yes

No

1985

Gradinia

In port

No

Not reported

No

1985

Isabella

Unloading

No

Yes

Yes
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Valve leakage. Tank cover plate
fractures.
Stranded. Severe damage to
bottom, ballast tanks, motors
water damaged, bottom of
containment system set up.
Shaft moved against rudder.
Tail shaft fractured
Stranded. Ballast tanks all
flooded and listing. Extensive
bottom damage.
Fire in engine room. No
structural damage sustained–
limited to engine room.
Steering gear failure. No details
of damage reported.
Cargo valve failure. Cargo
overflow. Deck fractures.

1989

Tellier

Loading

No

Yes

Yes

1990

Bachir Chihani

At sea

No

Yes

No

2002

LNG ship Norman
Lady

East of the
Strait of
Gibraltar

At sea

No

Yes

No

2010

Montoir de Bretagne
terminal

France

Unloading

No

Yes

No

2010

Withnell Bay facility

Australia

Loading

No

Yes

Yes

2011

Yung An LNG
terminal

Taiwan

Unloading

No

No

No

2011

Pyeongtaek LNG
terminal

South
Korea

Unloading

No

Yes

Yes

Broke moorings. Hull and deck
fractures.
Sustained structural cracks
allegedly caused by stressing
and fatigue in inner hull.
Collision with a U.S. Navy
nuclear-powered attack
submarine, the U.S.S
Oklahoma City. In ballast
condition. Ship suffered a
leakage of seawater into the
double bottom dry tank area.
The incident occurred when
liquid passed into the gas
take-off line during discharge
operations. The damage
sustained extended to part of
the ship's manifold and its feed
lines.
The ship suffered cryogenic
burns when 2,000 to 4,000 liters
of LNG were spilt.
The vessel's master decided to
suspend the discharge and
move the ship off the berth but
the problems were eventually
rectified and the vessel returned
to complete the discharge of its
cargo.
The ship disconnected from the
berth after what was described
as a very small leak of LNG was
reported around the top of one
emergency release coupler
shortly after a scheduled
overhaul of the unloading arms
had been completed. Seals and
ball valves were replaced on the
unloading arms and discharge
recommenced using the
remaining two arms.

3.4 The generic model of LNG fuelled passenger ferries
A generic model of LNG fuelled passenger ferries needs to be developed according
to the IMO’s guideline for Formal Safety Assessment (IMO, 2007, p.7), taking into
consideration of the particular ship structure and characteristics of LNG fuelled
propulsion of the passenger ferries.

The design and arrangements of LNG fuelled passenger ferries are assumed to satisfy
the requirements of the IMO interim guidelines on the gas fuelled ships as well as the
other requirements of IMO regulations to the passenger ships. The LNG fuel storage
tanks are assumed to be located in the enclosed space. The ships are engaged in the
short sea voyage in the coastal water.

20

For a generic LNG fuelled passenger ferries, the following assumptions are followed:
1. The average number of operational days per year: 330 days.
2. The average number of passengers on board each trip: 500 persons.
3. The average number of crew on board: 30 persons.
4. Operational hours per day: 16 hours.
5. Period for bunkering of LNG: every 4-5 days, bunker operation is assumed to be
carried out by truck load LNG when the ship alongside the berth after operation and
with no passengers on board.

3.5 Identification of fire/ explosion Hazards
Peachey suggest that one way to identify hazards is to develop a flow chart of the
operations which are decided to assess. It is necessary to list each overall function or
activity being performed for developing the flow chart (Peachey, 1999).
The process of daily operation of LNG fuelled ferries could be divided in to the
following steps (Figure 5):
1. Prepare for sailing
2. Departing Quay
3. Under way
4. Arriving at port, mooring and preparing for unloading
5. Unloading
Each step of operations includes the following activities:
Preparation for sailing:
(1) The ferries moors alongside the quay, and crew keep watch on board.
(2) Passengers embark the ships and the tickets are checked before embarkation.
(3) The cars and trucks are driven onto the vehicle deck, and lashed by the crews.
(3) All equipments of ships related to the safety of navigation are checked and tested
before sailing, and the conditions of lased vehicles and cargoes are inspected.
(4) Whether forecast on the route line is received and analyzed, the voyage plan are
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checked and ensured.
(5) Information is exchanged between the master and officers by a meeting or by
radio for the understanding of the voyage.
(6) The passengers come into the passenger cabins for a seat; drivers also leave their
cars or trucks for a rest.
(7) Safety instruction is introduced to the passengers after the passengers embarking
on board.

Departing quay:
(1) All preparation works for departure and sailing have been finished, and ramp is
heaved up or removed and the bow door is closed.
(2) Unberth operation: The officers and crew are in position for the unberth operation,
and departure is reported to the VTS or port authority according to the local
regulations.
(3) The main engine was started and the mooring lines are cast off, the ferries usually
leave the berth by its own thrusters and maneuverability, and the telegraph of engine
is frequently changed for maneuvering.

Under way:
(1) Navigation in the port area: The ferry departs the quay and sails in the port area
which is a limited space.
(2) Navigation in the open water: The ferry leaves the port and sails to the open
water and the speed of ship turns to be fixed.
(3) Passenger services are provided such as catering and entertainment by videos,
and the passengers are free to visit the non- restricted public areas of the ship.
(4) Patrols are carried out by the crew to the areas of the ship, especially the
passenger cabins, vehicle decks, LNG storage rooms and engine rooms.
(5) The conditions of ship such as the indicators and alarms of the LNG fuelled
propulsion systems are monitored from the bridge and control rooms by the officers.
(6) The deck officers and/or captain keep watch on the bridge for the safety of
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navigation, take actions to prevent the collision, ground, contact and other accidents
from happening.

Docking:
(1) Arriving is reported to the VTS or port authority according to the local
regulations.
(2) Related Information of docking operation is exchanged between the master,
officers and crew before arriving.
(3) Inspections to the related equipments and prepare works are conducted before
arriving.
(4) The ferry enters the port and all the crew are in position for the operation of
docking.
(5) The ferry berths alongside the quay, the bow door is opened and the ramp is laid
down for unloading.

Unloading:
(1) The passengers disembark the ferry, and the vehicles on the ferry are unlashed
and driven to the shore.
(2) The crew keep watch on the ferry to ensure the ship mooring alongside the berth
safely.

Bunkering:
(1) Information related to the operation is exchanged between the crew on board and
workers ashore before the bunkering.
(2) The critical equipments are inspected, preparing works such as blowing of the
pipelines by inert gas is conducted according to the procedure requirements of
bunkering.
(3) The situation of bunkering is monitored during the operation to prevent the over
pressure of bunkering system or overfill of the LNG storage tanks and leakage of
LNG fuel.
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(4) After the finish of bunkering, the pipelines are blown out with the inert gas and
disconnected according to the procedure of bunkering operation.

Based on the above operation activities of LNG fuelled ferries, refer to the
SAFEDOR HAZID reports for RoPax and TNO report for Assessment of hazard
identification study MTS Argonon, potential hazards related to the fire/ explosion of
LNG fuelled passenger ferries are identified according to the operation phrases.

Table 4

Potential hazards related to the fire/ explosion of LNG fuelled
passenger ferries

Operation

Hazards

Fire, explosion.

Improper cargo and luggage inspection

Fire, explosion.

Collision with other
ships/quay

Current and wind.
Inadequate port control.
Poor knowledge of pleasure crafts/Sail ships.
Weather conditions and swell.
Technical failure.

Damage and puncture of the ship
hull and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Grounding

Current and wind.
Swell and bad weather.
Collision avoidance.

Damage and puncture of the ship
bottom and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Fire/Explosion

loading

Petrol leakage
Uncontrolled dangerous
cargo aboard

Departing
quay

Departing
quay

Under way

Collision with ships

Under way

Collision with fixed
objects

Under way

Consequence

Fire starting in car because of hot breaks, internal
electric failure and petrol leakage.
Fire starting in refrigerating units connected to
the ships electrical system.
Leakage from cars and trucks.

loading

loading

Cause

Grounding

Crossing traffic in certain areas.
Collision avoidance.
Technical and Human failure.
Improper training on use of bridge equipments.
Communication problems, such as hard to reach
the other ship on radio.
Loss of control
Technical failure
Human error
Bad navigational information.
Incorrect information.
Buoy out of position
Current and wind.
Swell and bad weather.
Human error/Interaction between officers and
Captain.
Navigation equipment failure.
Collision avoidance.
Propulsion of steering failure (technical) during
acceleration or deacceleration.
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Hull damage and puncture of the
ship hull and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Hull damage and puncture of the
ship hull and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Break and puncture of the ship
bottom and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Under way

Under way

Under way

Docking

Docking

Docking

Fire/Explosion in
machinery spaces

LNG leakage and accumulation, technical
failure, hot surfaces, Engine room design.
Hydraulic systems in casing.

Fire in accommodation

Use of naked flame/Cigarettes in waste bins,
Laundry activities,
Fire in galley/pantry.
Portable electrical equipment

Fire in cargo area

Electrical problems in vehicles
Hull vibration may cause electrical problems on
cars or connection between ship and trailers
(refrigeration plants).
Gas/Petrol leakage.
Electric magnetism.
Open fire from such as smoking of crews

Fire/Explosion in
machinery spaces

LNG leakage and accumulation, technical
failure, hot surfaces, Engine room design.
Hydraulic systems in casing.

Fire in accommodation

Use of naked flame/Cigarettes in waste bins,
Laundry activities,
Fire in galley/pantry.
Portable electrical equipment

Fire in cargo area

Electrical problems in vehicles
Hull vibration may cause electrical problems on
cars or connection between ship and trailers
(refrigeration plants).
Gas/Petrol leakage.
Electric magnetism.
Open fire from such as smoking of crews
Loss of control,
- Technical failure,
- Human error,
- Bad navigational information.
- Incorrect information.
- buoy out of position

Fire/Explosion and spread to other
areas;
Loss of maneuverability and
power;
Damage to crewmembers and
panic on ship.
Fire/Explosion and spread to other
areas.
More complex problem for the
master and crew such as fire
fighting and organization for
preparing evacuation.
Free surfaces.
Fast fire escalation.
Smoke ingress in accommodation.
Injuries to crew members
Fire/Explosion and spread to other
areas;
Loss of maneuverability and
power;
Damage to crewmembers and
panic on ship.
Fire/Explosion and spread to other
areas.
More complex problem for the
master and crew such as fire
fighting and organization for
preparing evacuation.
Free surfaces.
Fast fire escalation.
Smoke ingress in accommodation.
Injuries to crew members

Hull damage and puncture of the
ship hull and LNG fuel tank
containment, leakage of LNG and
fire/ explosion.

Docking

Contact to the quay

Unloading

Fire/Explosion

Spill from cars accumulated during journey

High congestion of people on
deck. Damage to cars, ship and
passengers

Bunkering failure.

Electrical "transmitters" such as mobile phones
or ambulances.
Human error.
Fatigue for personnel.
Mechanical failure

Fire/Explosion.
Damage to ship and crew.

Bunkering

3.6 Ranking of the hazards
According to the IMO guideline on the FSA, the identified hazards and associated
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scenarios should be ranked for prioritization, a risk index could be established by
adding the probability/ frequency and consequence indices as follows:
Risk = Probability ×Consequences
Log (Risk) = Log (Frequency) + Log (Consequence)

The probability index and consequence index are defined in the following tables:
Table 5

Definition of Frequency index

PI

Frequency

Definition

7

Frequent

likely to occur once per month on one ship

10

5

Reasonably
probable

likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships

0.1

3

Remote

Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1000 ships

10-3

1

Extremely
remote

Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of
a world fleet of 5000ships

10-5

Table 6

F (per ship year)

Definition of consequence index

SI

Severity

Effects on human safety

Effects on ship

S (Equivalent fatalities)

1

Minor

Single or minor injuries

Local equipment damage

0.01

2

Significant

Multiple or severe injuries

Non-severe ship damage

0.1

3

Severe

Single fatality or multiple sever
injuries

4

Catastrophic Multiple fatalities

Severe damage
Total loss

1
10

The following table is the risk matrix based on the above tables.
Table 7

FI
7
6
5
4
3

Frequency
Frequent
Reasonably probable
Remote

Risk index (RI)
Severity (SI)
2
3
Significant
Severe
9
10
8
9
7
8
6
7
5
6

1
Minor
8
7
6
5
4
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4
Catastrophic
11
10
9
8
7

2
1

3
2

Extremely remote

4
3

5
4

6
5

After the identification of accidents, the causes could be grouped in terms of human
error, hardware failures, external events, and so on. The ‘‘fire’ accident subcategories
are listed as follows:
1. Bridge
2. Accommodation areas
3. Vehichle deck
4. Machinery spaces

The ranking of hazards of fire/ explosion of LNG fuelled passenger ferries in the
different phrases of operation could be carried out using the Probability and
Consequence Scales defined before and results is shown in the Table 8 as follow:

Table 8
Operation
Accident subcategory

Fire Subcategories rankings by the Risk Matrix
Loading

Departing Quay

Under way

Docking

Unloading

Bridge

F1/S1=2

F1/S1=2

F1/S1=2

F1/S1=2

F1/S1=2

Accommodation

F2/S2=4

F4/S3=7

F4/S3=7

F4/S3=7

F2/S2=4

Vehicle deck

F3/S3=6

F3/S2=5

F3/S2=5

F3/S2=5

F3/S3=6

Machinery spaces

F2/S2=4

F3/S3=6

F3/S3=6

F3/S3=6

F2/S2=4

Based on the above table, the fire subcategories with risk index less than RI=5 would
not be investigated further as their level is considered to be acceptably low.
3.7 Summary
According to the analysis above, the top rank hazards to the fire/explosion of LNG
fuelled passenger ferries could be identified as follows:
1. Fire or explosion during loading.
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2. Fire in accommodation while in open sea or navigating in coastal waters.
3. Fire in machinery spaces while in open sea or navigating in coastal waters.
4. Fire on vehicle deck while unloading due to accumulation of fuel spills during
journey.
5. Gas leakage and accumulation due to over pressure, technical failure or
operational errors.
6. Gas leakage due to damage to the LNG fuel tank containment caused by collision,
ground or contact.
7. Fire or explosion due to the bunkering failure.
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Chapter Ⅳ Risk Analysis to the High Ranking Hazards and Associated
Scenarios

4.1 Scope of study
Based on the results of HAZID of fire/explosion to the LNG fuelled passenger ferries
in the last Chapter, the high ranking hazards and associated scenarios would be
investigated in more detail. The risk of loss of life among the passengers and crew on
board would be estimated to the possible extend by calculating of Individual Risk,
the Potential Loss of Life in each identified scenario.
4.2 Method and techniques
The Risk Contribution Tree (RCT) of fire/ explosion on LNG fuelled passenger
ferries would be established, techniques of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree
Analysis (ETA) would be used in the session. Due to limited accident and failure
data of the LNG fuelled passenger ferries, statistics of LNG carriers and RoPax Ships
with similar feature would be referred.
4.3 Risk model
A Risk Contribution Tree (RCT) of fire/explosion is established as follows (Figure 8),
the top-half above “fire/ explosion” is a graphical representation of the accident
sub-category with the direct causes initiated and combined to cause the sub-category
accidents by using fault trees, and the bottom-half below “fire/explosion” is an event
tree representation of the development of the accident and its final results in different
magnitudes of loss (IMO, 2007, p.40).
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Fire under control

Y

Successful evacuation

Y

Loss of life

Y

Event Tree Analysis
Accident category consequences

N
N

N

Fire/ Explosion

Fire sub-category

Bridge

Accommodation

Machinery Spaces

And

And

Or

Smoking

Vehicle Decks

Leakage of
gas /fuel

Heat, Flame

Or

Petrol
leakage

Ignition
source

Or
Or

Passengers

Ignition
source

Crews

Galley

Electrical
equipment

Mechanical
failure

Or

Damage of
containment

Electrical
problems in
vehicles

Or

Collision

Ground

Contact

Figure 8 The Risk contribution tree of fire/explosion of the LNG fuelled passenger ferry
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Smoking
from crews

4.4

Consequence assessment

The total risk of fire/explosion of LNG fuelled passenger ferry is assumed to be the
sum of risk contribution from the following selected accident sub-category scenarios
(Figure 9). The risk contribution from the “fire/ explosion in bridge” is assumed to be
negligible in comparison based on the previous analysis. The risk contribution from
each of sub- category scenario would be estimated based on detail risk models and
event trees.

Risk of fire/explosion in accommodation

Risk of fire/explosion in machinery spaces

Risk of fire/explosion on vehicle deck

Total risk of fire/
explosion

Risk of fire/explosion caused by collision

Risk of fire/explosion caused by grounding

Risk of fire/explosion caused by contact

Risk of fire/explosion due to bunkering failure

Figure 9 Overall risk model of fire/explosion on LNG fuelled passenger ferries

Due to the scarce accident records of LNG fuelled passenger ferries, and the
probability of fire/explosion in accommodation and vehicle deck spread to the
machinery spaces and lead to the leakage and ignition of LNG is regarded as
negligible (IMO, 2007, p.42). Therefore the fire/ explosion in accommodation and
vehicle deck on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to resemble similar fire
incidents on the oil fuelled Ro-Pax ships, the results from a review of Ro-Pax ships
would be used ( IMO, 2008, p.44) .
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4.4.1 Fire/ explosion in accommodation
According to the report of FSA on RoPax ships submitted by Denmark, the overall
frequency for fire/explosion incidents estimated for RoPax of 1,000 GRT and above
is 8.28 E-03 based on the 1994-2004 world-wide experience, and the percentage of
fire/explosion incidents in accommodation is 24%. So the frequency of fire/
explosion in accommodation on LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to be 1.99
E-03. The percentage of non-escalation and escalation for fire incidents in
accommodation is 81% and 19% respectively, and the percentage of unsuccessful
evacuation is 20 % in this category (IMO, 2008, p.44).
An event tree is established as follows and the frequency of different situations in the
fire/explosion at accommodation is identified:

Minor damage

Probability

Frequency

per fire

per ship year

0.194400

1.61E-03

0.036480

3.02E-04

0.009120

7.55E-05

0.81
Fire/ Explosion at
accommodation
1.99
E-03
per ship year

No or successful evacuation
Escalation
0.19

0.8

Unsuccessful evacuation
0.2

Figure 10 The Events Tree of Fire/Explosion at accommodation

Based on the above event tree, the outcomes of fire/ explosion in accommodation
could be identified as follows:
The average number of passengers on the LNG fuelled ferries is assumed to be 500
persons each trip and the average number of crew is assumed to be 30 persons in the
generic model in section 3.4. The average fatality rates for the fire incidents in
accommodation with unsuccessful evacuation is assumed to be 8% which had been
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used during the North West European project study (IMO, 2008, p.45), it will also be
used in the calculation of this study.
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.55E-05 × 0.08 = 6.04 × E-06
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × 7.55E-05 × 0.08 = 3.2 × E-03

4.4.2 Fire/explosion on vehicle deck
According to the report of FSA on RoPax ships submitted by Denmark, the estimated
overall frequency for fire/explosion incidents is 8.28 E-03 and the percentage of
fire/explosion incidents on vehicle deck is 12%, so the frequency of fire/ explosion
on vehicle deck of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is assumed to be 9.94 E-04. The
percentage of non-escalation and escalation for fire incidents in accommodation is
assumed to be 71% and 29% respectively, and the percentage of unsuccessful
evacuation is 25 % in this category (IMO, 2008, p.44).
An event tree is established and the frequency of different situations in the
fire/explosion on vehicle deck is identified as follows:

Minor damage

Probability

Frequency

per fire

per ship year

0.085200

7.05E-04

0.026100

2.16E-04

0.008700

7.20E-05

0.71
Fire/ Explosion on
vehicle deck
9.94
E-04
per ship year

No or successful evacuation
Escalation
0.29

0.75

Unsuccessful evacuation
0.25

Figure 11 The Events Tree of Fire/Explosion on vehicle deck

The assumption of average fatality rates used in the North West European project
study for the fire incidents on vehicle deck with unsuccessful evacuation also is 8%
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(FSA, 2008, p.45), it is used in the following calculation of outcomes:
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.20E-05 × 0.08 = 5.76 × E-06
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × 7.20E-05 × 0.08 = 3.05 × E-03

4.4.3 Fire/explosion in machinery spaces with no LNG leakage and ignition
In this scenario, the fire/explosion with no LNG leakage and ignition in machinery
spaces of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is similar to oil fuelled passenger ferries, so
the results from a review of Ro-Pax ships will be used in this study.
The frequency of fire/ explosion in machinery space of LNG fuelled passenger
ferries is assumed to be 5.30 E-03. The percentage of non- escalation and escalation
for fire incidents in accommodation is assumed to be 71% and 29% respectively, and
the percentage of unsuccessful evacuation and fire uncontrolled is 5% respectively in
this category (IMO, 2008, p.44).

Minor damage
Fire/ Explosion in
machinery spaces

Probability

Frequency

per fire

per ship year

0.454400

3.76E-03

0.167040

1.38E-03

0.009280

7.68E-05

0.009280

7.68E-05

0.71

5.30
E-03
per ship year

No or successful evacuation
Escalation
0.29

0.9
Unsuccessful evacuation
0.05
Fire uncontrolled
0.05

Figure 12 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion in machinery spaces
The assumption of average fatality rates used in the North West European project
study for major fire incidents in machinery spaces is 0.7% and average fatality rates
for the engine room fire uncontrolled is 75% (FSA, 2008, p.45). The outcomes are
obtained form the following calculations.:
Individual Risk (per year) = 7.68E-05 × 0.007 + 7.68E-05 × 0.75= 5.81 × E-05
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PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (7.68E-05 × 0.007 + 7.68E-05 × 0.75) = 3.08× E-02

4.4.4 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by collision
In this scenario, the frequency of collision of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is
assumed to the same as RoPax ships, 1.25E-02 per ship year which is based on the
statistics of RoPax of 1000GRT and above during the period 1994-2004; the
percentage of collisions under way is 63% and 37% of the remaining are striking
while at berth；in the collision incidents under way, 84% of the incidents are recorded
as minor damage and 16% of the remains are recorded as serious casualty (IMO,
2008, p.25). These percentages and probabilities would be used in the event trees.
During the collision scenario, the LNG fuelled passenger ferry could be a striking
ship or a being struck ship, the possibility is assumed to be 50%-50% based on the
conclusion on analysis of collision casualty data (IMO, 2004). And for a striking ship,
the probability of receiving critical damage is assumed to be negligible, so the
distribution of this scenario to the consequence of collision is discounted.
In the damage extent model, there are two situations: the collision damage location in
the LNG fuel tank areas and out of the LNG fuel tank areas. According to the IMO
guideline on the LNG fuelled ships, there are no requirements of location of LNG
fuel tank on the distance from fore or aft of ships on the longitudinal direction. In the
study, the location of LNG fuel tank(s) on passenger ferries is assumed to resemble
the location of cargo tanks on a typical LNG vessel, in the following area: Between
the foremost 2/15 of the ship and the aft 1/5 of the ship. Based on the previous study
(Laubenstein & Mains, 2001), the probability of collision damage location
distribution could be estimated: P (foremost 2/15) = 0.2 and P (aft1/5) = 0.15. So the
probability of collision damage locates in the LNG fuel tank areas is 0.65.
Based on a couple of previous studies, the possibility of critical damage caused by
collisions with penetration of outer hull is P=0.38 for passenger ships (Olufsen &
Spouge, 2003), and the result is assumed to be applicable to the LNG fuelled
passenger ferries.
Even if there is a penetration of outer hull by collision, it will not necessary be a
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damage to the containment of LNG fuel tanks. According to the IMO guideline for
gas-fuelled ships, the LNG fuel storage tank in enclosed spaces should be placed as
close as possible to the centerline of ship and no less than B/5 from the ship side
(IMO, 2009, p.19). So if the depth of a critical damage to ship side is more than B/5
in the transverse direction, it is assumed the LNG fuel tank would be penetrated.
From the damage statistics collected by the HARDER project in the previous study
(Laubenstein & Mains, 2001), the damage penetration: P (b> B/5) = 0.35.
In the condition of penetration of LNG fuel tanks and LNG leakage caused by
collision, the LNG specific hazards might materialize, and the Rapid Phase
Transition (RPT) is the hazard most likely happens. There are three possible
scenarios following the Rapid Phase Transition: First, there is no ignition of the LNG
vapour and the gas disperse into the atmosphere due to the concentration is below the
lower flammable limit; secondly, the LNG vapour is ignited during collision by
ignited source such as sparks from steel; Thirdly, a vapour cloud is formed and
drifted away from the collision area, gets ignited and burns back to the LNG pool
and form a pool fire. Based on the expert judgment, the possibility of first scenario is
80% and the possibility of second and third scenario is 10% respectively (IMO, 2007,
p.38).
Based on the above analysis, an event tree could be established as follows:
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Striking at berth

Collision of LNG
fuelled ferries
1.25E-02 per
ship year

0.37
Minor Damage

0.84
Collision under way
Striking ship

0.63
Serious Damage

0.16

Damage location out
of the tank areas

0.5

0.35

Struck ship

No penetration of hull

0.5

Damage location in the
tank areas

0.65

0.62

b≤ B/5
0.65

Penetration of hull

No ignition

0.8

0.38

b> B/5
0.35

Ignition of vapor
with no pool fire

0.1
Pool fire

0.1

Figure 13 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by collision

The possibility and frequency of different scenarios after the penetration of
containment of LNG fuel tank caused by collision could be identified as follows:

Table 9

Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by collision

Scenarios

Possibility

Frequency

Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition 0.003485664

4.36 E-05

Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire 0.000435708

5.45 E-06

Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire

5.45 E-06

0.000435708

Consequences of LNG accidents on the ferries are difficult to be estimated as no
statistics are available. In the study, the average fatality rates of the scenario that
ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire is assumed to be 0.7% as used for the major
fire incidents in machinery spaces in the North West European project study. And the
fatality rates in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire would refer to
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the results from the study of LNG carriers, it is 52.5% and based on the expert
judgment from a Delphi session (IMO, 2007, p.39). The calculation of consequence
is illustrated as follows:
Individual Risk (per year) = 5.45 E-06× 0.007 + 5.45 E-06× 0.525= 2.90 × E-06
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (5.45 E-06× 0.007 + 5.45 E-06× 0.525) = 1.54× E-03

4.4.5 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by grounding
In this scenario, the frequency of grounding of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is
assumed to be the same as RoPax ships, 9.57 E-03 per ship year. According to the
statistics, 68% of the grounding incidents were recorded as minor incidents and 32%
of the incidents were recorded as serious casualty (IMO, 2008, p.30). These
frequency and probability would be used in the following event tree.
The LNG fuel tank location areas in the longitudinal direction are assumed to be
similar to those in the collision scenario, between the foremost 2/15 and the aft 1/5 of
the ship. According to the grounding damage location distributions collected by the
HARDER project, the probability of receiving damage in the foremost 2/15 of ship is
P (foremost 2/15) = 0.2 and in the aft 1/5 of the ship is P (aft 1/5) = 0.1, so the
possibility of damage location within the LNG fuel tank areas is 0.7 in the
grounding.
In the grounding damage extend model, the possibility of critical damage with the
crack of outer hull is estimated to be 0.76 for passenger ships based on the previous
study (Olufsen & Spouge, 2003). Even if there is a crack of outer hull of the ship by
grounding, it is not necessarily for the penetration of LNG fuel tank. And according
to the requirements of IMO guideline on the LNG fuelled ships, the location of LNG
fuel tank in enclosed spaces should be no less than the lesser of B/15 and 2 m from
the bottom plating (IMO, 2009, p.19), so LNG fuel tanks is assumed to be penetrated
if the damage depth is more than 2 m. Based on the statistics collected by the
HARDER project, the probability of damage depth more than 2m is : P (d> 2 meters)
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= 0.12 (IMO, 2007, p. 40), it is used in the event tree of this study.
If there is LNG leakage in the grounding accident, the LNG hazards would
materialize similar to the collision scenario. The difference is that LNG will leak
from the bottom of ship compared to the leak from side of ship in the collision.
Possible scenarios following the Rapid Phase Transition in the grounding are similar
to the scenarios in collision: LNG vapor disperse into the atmosphere with no
ignition because the concentration is below the lower flammable limit; LNG vapour
is ignited but with no pool fire; LNG vapour leakage form a cloud and is ignited,
burns back to cause a fire pool. The probability of the above three scenarios are
assumed to be similar to that in the collision, which are 0.8, 0.1 and 0.1 respectively.
An event tree could be established as follows based on the above analysis:

Minor damage

Grounding of LNG
fuelled ferries

0.68

Damage location out
of the tank areas

0.30

9.57 E-03per
ship year

No penetration of hull
Serious damage

0.24

0.32

d≤ 2m

Damage location in the
tank areas

0.70

0.88
Penetration of hull
No ignition

0.8

0.76
d > 2m
0.12

Ignition of vapor
with no pool fire

0.1
Pool fire

0.1

Figure 14 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by grounding

The possibility and frequency of different scenarios after the penetration of LNG fuel
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tank and RPT caused by grounding could be identified as follows:

Table 10 Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by grounding
Scenarios

Possibility

Frequency

Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition

0.01634304

1.56 E-04

Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire

0.00204288

1.96E-05

Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire

0.00204288

1.96E-05

In the study, the average fatality rates of the scenarios in grounding are assumed to
be similar to those in the collision: the fatality rate of ignition of LNG vapor with no
pool fire is assumed to be 0.7% and 52.5% in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor
with a pool fire. The calculation of consequence is illustrated as follows:

Individual Risk (per year) = 1.96 E-05× 0.007 + 1.96 E-05× 0.525= 1.04 × E-05
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (1.96 E-05× 0.007 + 1.96 E-05× 0.525) = 5.53× E-03

4.4.6 Fire/explosion due to damage of containment caused by contact
In this scenario, the frequency of contact of LNG fuelled passenger ferries is
assumed to be the same as RoPax ships, 1.25 E-02 per ship year; according to the
statistics, 89% of the contact incidents were recorded as minor incidents and 11% of
incidents were recorded as serious casualty (IMO, 2008, p.34). These frequency and
percentage would be used in the event tree.
In the study, the contact scenario is considered to be very similar to the grounding
scenario, except for the probability of flooding, other risk distributions and
probabilities from the contact scenario are assumed to be identical to the grounding
scenario. And according to the previous study (Olufsen & Spouge, 2003), the
probability of flooding in the contact is assumed to be 0.38. An event tree could be
established as follows:
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Minor damage

Contact of LNG
fuelled ferries
1.25
E-02
per ship year

0.89

Damage location out
of the tank areas

0.30
Serious damage
No flooding

0.11
Damage location in the
tank areas

0.62
d≤ 2m

0.70
Flooding

0.38

0.88

No ignition

d > 2m

Ignition of vapor
with no pool fire

0.8

0.12

0.1
Pool fire

0.1

Figure 15 The Event Tree of Fire/Explosion caused by contact

The possibility and frequency of different scenarios after the penetration of LNG fuel
tank and RPT caused by contact could be identified as follows:

Table 11

Possibility and frequency of different scenarios caused by collision

Scenarios

Possibility

Frequency

Leakage of LNG vapor with no ignition

0.00280896

3.51 E-05

Ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire

0.00035112

4.39 E-06

Ignition of LNG vapor with pool fire

0.00035112

4.39 E-06

The average fatality rates of the scenarios in the contact are assumed to be similar as
in the grounding: the fatality rate of ignition of LNG vapor with no pool fire is
assumed to be 0.7% and fatality rate in the scenario of ignition of LNG vapor with a
pool fire is assumed to be 52.5%. The calculation of consequence is illustrated as
follows:
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Individual Risk (per year) = 4.39 E-06× 0.007 + 4.39 E-06× 0.525= 2.34× E-06
PLL (per ship year) = 530 × (3.99 E-05× 0.007 + 3.99 E-05× 0.525) = 1.24× E-03

4.4.7 Fire/explosion due to bunkering failure
According to the statistics (IMO, 2007, p.43), a LNG carriers conduct 12 roundtrips a
year on average and spend about 2 days of loading/unloading cargo per roundtrip.
There have been 22 loading/ unloading incidents recorded in the industry history, and
9 of the incidents had leakage of LNG. The frequency of loading/unloading accidents
with leakage of LNG is estimated to be 3.2 E-03 per ship year (Vanem & Antão,
2008, p.1333).
As for the bunkering operation of the LNG fuelled ferries, it is similar to the
loading/unloading operation of LNG carriers. Based on the experience of LNG
fuelled ferries in Norway, the most common bunkering method is truck to ship, the
ship is refueled every 4-5 days , the bunkering rate is about 40m3/hour and about 2
hour for the bunkering peroration each time (DNV, 2013, p.23). The bunkering
operation of LNG fuelled ferries is much more frequent compared to the LNG
carriers loading/unloading operation, but the potential consequences of LNG
bunkering failure might be less severe than the LNG carrier accidents as the small
scale of volume (Algell & Bakosch, 2012, pp.106-107).
.
As the bunkering operation of LNG fuelled ferries is conducted when out of service
with no passengers on board, and the related accident statistics are not available, so
the quantitative consequences of fire/ explosion caused by bunkering failure is not
taken into account in the study.

4.5 Risk summation
Based on the calculation of above risk models, the consequences of fire/ explosion
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risk from different scenarios of the LNG fuelled passenger ferries could be
summarized as follows (Table 12):

Table 12

Summary Risk Calculations of fire/explosion

fire/explosion in accommodation

Individual Risk (per
year)
6.04 × E-06

PLL (per ship
year)
3.20 × E-03

fire/explosion on vehicle deck

5.76 × E-06

3.05 × E-03

7%

fire/explosion in machinery spaces

5.81 × E-05

3.08× E-02

68%

fire/explosion caused by collision

2.90 × E-06

1.54× E-03

3%

fire/explosion caused by grounding

1.04 × E-05

5.53× E-03

12%

fire/explosion caused by contact

2.34× E-06

1.24× E-03

3%

Total

8.55×E-05

4.54×E-02

100%

PLL (%)
7%

The total individual risk of fire/explosion calculated by the risk models is 8.55×E-05,
based on the assumption that the vessel at sea and the person on board for a full year.
From the above table, we can conclude that the fire/explosion in the machine spaces
has the highest frequency of occurring; the fire/explosion due to damage of
containment caused by collision, contact has relatively low frequency but high
fatality rate, and the fire/explosion caused by grounding has relatively high
frequency of occurring.
4.6 Summary
The consequences of fire/explosion risk from several major scenarios on the LNG
fuelled passenger ferries are calculated based on the risk models of event trees. Some
of the assumptions and results from the research reports of RoPax ships and LNG
carriers are used in the calculation of the risk models, so the outcomes of the study
still contain uncertainties. However, due to the limited statistics of LNG fuelled
passenger ferries, best efforts are made to provide a rational estimation of the risk
models to the possible extend.
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Chapter Ⅴ Recommendations
5.1 Identified high risk areas and recommended measures
Based on the above analysis on risk models of different fire/explosion scenarios, the
high risk areas could be identified and potential measurements could be
recommended as follows:
1. Navigation safety. The improvement of navigation safety could reduce the
frequency of collision, grounding and contact, would also reduce the risk of damage
of LNG fuel tank containment and fire/explosion caused by the leakage of LNG.
According to the previous study (Antão & Soares, 2006, p.115), human factors are
the dominant factors towards the accidents of groundings and collisions of RoPax
vessels, so the measurements for reducing the human errors such as the navigator
training could be taken; on the other hand, the improvement of bridge design and
navigation equipments such as ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information
System), AIS (Automatic Identification System) integration with radar could be cost
efficient options for promoting the navigation safety of passenger ships (IMO, 2004,
p.2).
2. Gas detecting and ventilation system. The flammable limit of natural gas is in a
small range (5%- 15%), so the gas detecting system is very important to discover the
leakage of LNG and give alarms to the crew timely; ventilation system is very
critical for reducing the concentration of natural gas to below the lower flammable
limit (LFL) if the leakage happened.
3. Fire protection. The fire protection could prevent or slow down the fire/ explosion
escalation from the ignition source to the other compartments or areas of the ship,
providing more time for the evacuation of passengers as well as crew and the fire
fighting operation.
4. Evacuation operation and arrangements. According to the previous study (Melhem
& Ozog, 2007, p.10), the fatality rate of personnel on board in the pool fire is largely

44

determined by the distance from the ignition source and exposure time to the thermal
radiation of the pool fire. So the evacuation drills are needed to be carried out
frequently to improve the efficiency of evacuation operations after the fire/ explosion
of LNG leakage, the safety distance from the potential pool fire point to the
evacuation point should be taken into account in the design and arrangement of
evacuation equipments.
5. Crew training. The LNG has specific hazards compared to conventional fuel oil, so
the crew serving on the LNG fuelled passenger ferries should receive professional
training on familiar with the LNG specific hazards, learn how to manage and utilize
the LNG fuel safely in daily operation.
6. Bunkering operation. Because of the high frequency of bunkering operation, it is a
high risk area for the leakage of LNG and result in fire/explosion , so good practice,
safety standards and procedures should be set up for the bunkering operation , the
personnel involved in LNG bunkering including crew onboard and operators onshore

should receive related training.
7. Source of ignition. The fire/explosion is caused by the combining the flammable
materials and ignition source, so control to the ignition source is critical to the
reduction of fire/explosion risk on the LNG fuelled ferry. The naked fire such as
smoking of cigarette and could be prohibited by set up no-smoking area; the
electrical equipments fitted in the gas atmospheres should satisfy the related
standards and prevent the sparks during operation; heat sources could be controlled
or separated from the flammable materials.
5.2 Suggestions for the safety administration
The development of LNG fuelled ships is a new trend of green ships, and it also
brings new challenges to the maritime administration, especially for the LNG fuelled
passenger ferries which would result in a large amount of deaths if the fire/explosion
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occurs on board. Some suggestions are put forward for the maritime administration
of LNG fuelled ferries as follows:
1. Specific guidelines and standards should be made for the safety of application of
LNG fuel on board. Although the IMO Interim guidelines on the gas-fuelled ships
has established a framework of requirements for the safety of LNG propulsion ships,
there are still a number of specific issues such as bunkering configuration and
operation that haven’t been covered by the regulations. International regulations may
be developed for the specific issues during the application of LNG fuel on board, and
the class society and maritime administration of each contating state also play a key
role in making rules for the developing of LNG fuel.
2. Risk assessment should be carried out for the new type of LNG fuelled ships. As a
new type of ships, safety standards and experience for the vessel design, construction,
installation and operation would not be available enough, so related risk assessments
are essential to be carried out for the reduction of potential risks and improvement of
safety.
3. Promoting the education and training to the crew and the public. Compared to the
conventional fuel oil, the LNG fuel is not much familiar to the crew, ship owners,
passengers and other stakeholders of the public. On one hand, the crew serving on
the LNG fuelled ships should receive training on LNG hazards, correct operation and
maintenance to the gas-related equipments as well as emergency exercises. On the
other hand, the stakeholders of the public should be aware of the LNG hazards
correctly, and the administration should eliminate their excessive worries on the
application of LNG fuel on board, and protect their personal safety and properties
efficiently.
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Chapter Ⅵ Conclusions
According to the calculation of risk models in this study, the fire/explosions in the
machinery spaces of LNG fuelled ferries have the highest frequency and fatality
while the fire/explosions due to the damage of LNG containment caused by collision,
grounding and contact have relatively low frequency, however the results might be
very serious. Bunkering operations of LNG fuel is also a high risk area of
fire/explosion to be concerned. Evacuation is very critical to the fatalities in each
fire/explosion scenario, especially when the pool fire caused by the leakage of LNG.
Standards and guidelines related to the specific issues of ship design, construction
and operation should be established as the development of application of LNG fuel
on board. Human factor is a key point to the safety of the LNG fuelled passenger
ferries, and related training and education should be conducted to the crew and the
public.
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